The Spatial Dimension  Of Take-Offs  And Sustainability: The Case Of East Asian Countries by Choi, Paul Moon Sub et al.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 719 The Clute Institute 
The Spatial Dimension  
Of Take-Offs  And Sustainability: 
The Case Of East Asian Countries 
Paul Moon Sub Choi, Ewha Womans University, Republic of Korea 
Jinhwan Oh, Ewha Womans University, Republic of Korea  
Changsu Ko, University of California, Los Angeles, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between the size of a country and its “take-off” for economic development. We 
find that most countries which experienced economic upheavals in the past decades are relatively small in terms of 
area. Specifically, take-offs appear to be quicker for smaller landmasses with larger potential workforce and higher 
population density, controlled for financial markets maturity, corporate governance, economic openness, and 
human capital development. We also find that take-offs are not sustainable by nature as most countries in East Asia 
that which experience take-offs are currently facing slow-downs of their economies. Through this finding, we predict 
that China may experience a slow-down at around 36% and may reach to the 50-60% of income level of the U.S. 
 
Keywords: Economic Development; Spatial Development Factors; Corporate Governance; Economic Openness; 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
evelopment processes are heterogeneous across countries and regions (Table 1). Some have 
continuously been in the stage of developed countries for more than half a century (e.g. Western 
Europe, the U.S. and Canada), while some have risen rapidly during the past decades (e.g. four East 
Asian “tigers,” such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). On the other hand, some countries have been 
left behind from the developed club (e.g. Argentina and Uruguay), while others have been caught in the poverty trap 
and have never experienced growth (e.g. Sub-Saharan African countries). In 1955, there were 18 countries whose 
per capita incomes were more than 50% of the U.S., and 15 of them are currently still maintaining their stata (Penn 
World Table 6.1).1 In comparison, 29 countries whose per capita income is more than 50% of the U.S. in 2007 have 
joined this club between 1970 and 2000. 
 
What makes these countries different from each other? How come some countries have shown rapid developments 
while others have not? Recently, geographical explanations for the process of economic development have drawn 
attention. Krugman (1991, 1998) argues that development is made in the interaction between centrifugal and 
centripetal forces in the core and periphery, thus making geography play a vital role in economic development. 
World Bank’s World Development Report (2009) puts emphasis on spatial policies (spatially blind, connective, and 
targeted) in each stage of incipient, intermediate, and advanced urbanization, and argues that successful urbanization 
and economic development can be achieved by “reshaping” the economic geography. 
 
This study starts from geographical perspectives. In particular, this paper investigates the size of a country as a 
determinant for its take-off. There has been a group of articles in the literature that used the population of a country 
as a development factor: Milner and Westaway (1993), Briguglio (1995), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1998), Armstrong and Read (1998), Briguglio (1998), and Easterly and Kraay (2000). In addition to 
population, we employed the actual geographical size (land area) of a country, and investigated whether small-sized 
is a necessary or sufficient condition for economic development.  
                                                
1 See Table 7, Appendix A, for a summary. 
D 
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Table 1. List of countries whose per capita income is above 50% of that of the U.S. 
KOR (South Korea), CYP (Cyprus), TWN (Taiwan), BHS (Bahamas), PRI (Puerto Rico), GRC (Greece, JPN (Japan), GER (Germany), ESP 
(Spain), CHL (Chile), IRL (Ireland), HKG (Hong Kong, ARE (United Arab Emirates), BMU (Bermuda), BRN (Brunei), KWT (Kuwait), MAC 
(Macao), QAT (Qatar), SGP (Singapore), ISR (Israel), BRB (Barbados), NZL (New Zealand), ITA (Italy), FRA (France), FIN (Finland), SWE 
(Sweden), DNK (Denmark), BEL (Belgium), NLD (Netherlands), AUT (Austria), AUS (Australia, CAN (Canada, ISL (Iceland), LUZ 
(Luxenburg), NOR (Norway), USA (United States).  
Year 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
No. of countries 18 19 19 22 34 39 37 35 38 36 41 44 
Country ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG * * * * * * 
 AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS 
 AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT 
 BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL 
 CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN 
 CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE CHE 
 DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK 
 FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN 
 FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA 
 GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR 
 ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL ISL 
 LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX LUX 
 NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD 
 NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR NOR 
 NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL NZL 
 SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE 
 URY * * * * * * * * * * * 
 VEN VEN * * * * * * * * * * 
  ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR ISR 
  ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA 
   BRB BRB BRB BRB BRB BRB BRB BRB BRB BRB 
    ESP ESP ESP ESP ESP ESP ESP ESP ESP 
    GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC 
    JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN 
     ARE ARE ARE ARE ARE ARE ARE ARE 
     BHR BHR BHR BHR BHR * BHR BHR 
     BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU 
     BRN BRN BRN BRN BRN BRN BRN BRN 
     GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER 
     IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL 
     KWT KWT KWT KWT KWT KWT KWT KWT 
     LBY LBY LBY * * * * LBY 
     PLW PLW PLW PLW * * * * 
     QAT QAT QAT QAT QAT QAT QAT QAT 
     SAU SAU SAU SAU * * * * 
     TTO TTO * * * * TTO TTO 
      BHS BHS BHS BHS BHS BHS BHS 
      HKG HKG HKG HKG HKG HKG HKG 
      MAC MAC MAC MAC MAC MAC MAC 
      OMN OMN * * * OMN OMN 
      SGP SGP SGP SGP SGP SGP SGP 
         CYP CYP CYP CYP 
         KOR * KOR KOR 
         PRI PRI PRI PRI 
         TWN TWN TWN TWN 
           GNQ * 
           SVN SVN 
            BLR 
            CZE 
            MLT 
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 
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We argue that small countries (in terms of land area and population) are not necessarily efficient in taking off. 
However, most countries that experienced the “take-off” and have been “flying” for the past decades were relatively 
small. We will examine this by conducting panel regrssions. For robustness tests, we consider several control 
variables that may also affect development. La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) argue that the degrees of 
financial investor protection and governance enforcement are strongly and positively correlated with sustainable 
economic development. Lucas (2009) claims that open countries perform better in economic growth. In addition, 
Eichengreen et al. (2013) find that countries with highly educated people are advantageous in economic growth. In 
this research, the empirical implication is that an average economy grows faster the smaller the landmass, and/or the 
larger the potential workforce, and/or the higher the population density, controlled for the quality indices of capital 
markets, economic regime, openness, and human capital. 
 
However, take-off is not sustainable by nature and an economy may slow-down after a certain period of rapid 
growth regardless of its size. In this aspect, his study also examines a non-linear relationship between income levels 
and growth rates. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are paid extra attendtions, as they all went through successful 
take-offs and are good fits of the model that we suggest. Lessons of these countries are applied to China which is 
now undergoing a take-off to see when the economy is expected to slow-down. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides data description; Section 3 examines spatial factors that 
determine the take-off of an economy, controlled for other variables. Section 4 investigates the sustainability of 
take-off by examing a non-linear relationship between income levels and growth rates. Section 5 concludes the 
study. 
 
2. DATA 
 
We source Penn World Table 6.1 for the per capita of real GDPs of 190 countries relative to the U.S. between 1950 
and 2007. Except for the year of 1950 when there were substantial missing values, we referred to the countries 
whose income is above 50% of that of the U.S. as relatively rich or developed ones (Tables 1 and 7). This is a key 
variable in this study, as it will be used as a dependent variable in examining the determinants for take-off and as an 
explanatory variable in examining its sustainability. 
 
There are 17 countries that were listed, and these countries are named the “old-rich”, and summarized as Group 2 in 
Table 2. More importantly, there are 19 countries that were not listed in 1955, but later on listed in 2007. To confirm 
that our selection for countries have sustainable growths, this paper has outlined the following rules. Countries that 
satisfy these rules are named “take-offs”, and listed as Group 1 in Table 2. For 148 countries in Group 3, the average 
area is 683,879 square kilometers, average population is 34.2 million, and average density is 296. 
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For 148 countries in Group 3, average area is 683,879 (sq. km), average population is 34,228 ('000s), and average density is 296. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of countries in each group 
Group 1 
(19 take-offs) 
Land Area  
(sq. km) 
Population 
(2005, ‘000s) 
Population 
density (2005) 
Group 2  
(17 old riches) 
Land Area  
(sq. km) 
Population 
(2005, ‘000s) 
Population 
density (2005) 
Bahamas 10,070 325 23 Australia 7,617,930 20,395 3 
Bermuda 53 64 1,211 Austria 82,444 8,232 98 
Brunei 5,270 370 64 Barbados 431 253 589 
Chile 748,800 16,297 22 Belgium 30,278 10,415 341 
Cyprus 9,240 836 90 Canada 9,093,507 32,307 3 
Germany 349,223 82,409 231 Denmark 42,394 5,417 126 
Greece 130,800 11,064 84 Finland 304,473 5,244 16 
Hong Kong 1,042 6,883 6,263 France 640,053 61,013 111 
Ireland 68,890 4,187 60 Iceland 100,250 296 3 
Japan 374,744 127,449 337 Israel 20,330 6,692 302 
South Korea 98,190 47,566 478 Italy 294,020 58,645 195 
Kuwait 17,820 2,700 152 Luxembourg 2,586 464 179 
Macao 28 488 18,755 Netherlands 33,883 16,316 393 
Puerto Rico 8,870 3,913 441 New Zealand 268,021 4,111 15 
Qatar 11,437 885 80 Norway 307,442 4,635 12 
Singapore 683 4,267 6,247 Sweden 410,934 9,066 20 
Spain 499,542 43,060 85 United States 9,161,923 302,741 31 
Taiwan 32,260 22,653 702     
UAE 83,600 4,089 49     
Average 128,977 19,974 1,862 Average 1,671,229 32,132 143 
 
Some countries are filtered out from our sample according to the following criteria: 
 
   Even though a country is listed in year 2007, if its name is not shown at least three times or more in the 
past, it is ruled out. Development should be sustainable, thus Libya, Oman, and Trinidad and Tobago 
are ruled out. 
   A country must show its name at least three times, including for 2007. It is hard to judge whether a 
country is really growing if its name is listed only once or twice, thus Belarus, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, and Malta are ruled out. 
   A country whose name is not listed in 2007 is ruled out. Developments should be currently on-going, 
thus Argentina, Palau, Saudi Arabia, Uruguay, and Venezuela are ruled out. 
 
According to Table 2, countries in Group 1 (successful “take-offs”) are significantly smaller with an average land 
area of 128,977 square kilometers than those of Group 2 (“old riches”) with an average of 1,671,229. The average 
land area of all 190 countries is 683,879 square kilometers. In sum, the “old-rich” countries, on average, possess 
significantly larger territorries than the “take-off” countries as well as when compared to other average countries. It 
can be argued from this finding that both large and small states can experience economic development, but the 
“take-off” countries in Group 1 have relatively fewer populations than others. Specifically, the average population in 
Group 1 is almost half of Group 2 according to the entire sample and density: Countries which experienced rapid 
development have, on average, less population. This finding is consistent with that of Easterly and Kraay (2000), 
who report that “small states (in terms of population) have higher per capita GDP than other states.” Finally, the 
difference of density in each group is striking: The density in Group 1 is 10 times higher than that of Group 2, and 
six times higher than that of the entire world.  
 
On top of these variables, we consider several control variables that may affect take-off for an economy. There are 
many suggestions from previous papers for these variables. There is a sizable literature of documented claims 
regarding a positive association between economic developments and the “maturity” of capital markets and private 
sector corporate governance. La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) argue that the degrees of financial 
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investor protection and governance enforcement are strongly and positively correlated with sustainable economic 
developments. The spatial determinants of economic growth may be overstated if factors which proxy for such 
concern are not controlled for. In this regard, we use a number of well-cited variables from the law and economics 
literature: For sovereign legal system indicators, we source accounting standards (AS) from La Porta, et al. (1998) 
and anti-director rights (AD), which proxies for the degree of shareholder protections, from Djankov et al. (2008). 
We also calculate the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (SMCTG) as a relative measure of country-specific 
capital market development, also suggested by Djankov et al. (2008). Table 3 summarizes these variables. 
 
Lucas (2009) finds that “open” countries have shown better performance in terms of economic growth. We sourced 
the openness indicator as suggested by Sachs and Warner (1995), which defines an open (as opposed to “closed”) 
country as a sovereign jurisdiction that satisfies the following criteria: (1) have effective protection rates less than 40 
percent; (2) have quotas for less than 40 percent of imports, (3) have no currency controls or black markets in 
currency; (4) have no export marketing boards; and (5) are not socialist (Kornai, 1992). Eichengreen et al. (2013) 
showed that the ratio of “high” education positively affects economic growth. Our proxies for the degree of human 
capital are suggested by Barro and Lee (2012) which defines education-level indicators by measuring the 
proportions of graduates from the secondary and/or tertiary education programs among the population over the age 
of 25. 
 
This table presents various measures of nation-specific corporate governance. Accounting Standards (AS) is from La 
Porta, et al. (1998) whereas Antidirector Rights (AD), a proxy for degree of shareholder protection, and Stock 
Market Capitalization to GDP (SMCTG), a measure of equity market development, are suggested by Djankov, et al. 
(2008). Governance is considered "high" if a rating is higher than the median. 
 
Table 3. Sovereign corporate governance measures 
Group 1  
(19 take-offs) AD AS SMCTG 
Group 2  
(17 old riches) AD AS SMCTG 
Bahamas    Australia 4 75 5 
Bermuda    Austria 3 54 2.797 
Brunei    Barbados    
 Chile 4 52 4.496 Belgium 3 61 4.208 
Cyprus    Canada 4 74 4.665 
Germany 4 62 4.002 Denmark 4 62 4.071 
Greece 2 55 4.515 Finland 4 77 5.177 
Hong Kong 5 69 5.889 France 4 69 4.494 
Ireland 5  4.214 Iceland    
Japan 5 65 4.237 Israel    
South Korea 5 62 3.991 Italy 2 62 3.967 
Kuwait    Luxembourg 2  4.974 
Macao    Netherlands 3 64 4.881 
Puerto Rico    New Zealand 4 70 3.691 
Qatar    Norway 4 74 3.681 
Singapore 5 78 5.105 Sweden 4 83 4.721 
Spain 5 64 4.381 United States 3 71 4.957 
Taiwan 3 65 4.624     
UAE        
  
Against this backdrop, we consider the maturity proxies of capital markets (SMCTG: stock market capitalization to 
GDP) and sovereign-level governance (AD and AS), openness dummy variable (Openness), proportions on 
completion of secondary education and higher (Tertiary) education among the population over the age of 25. 
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3. SIZE AND TAKE-OFF: CORRELATION ANALYSIS AND PANEL REGRESSIONS 
 
In Table 4, the above findings are further examined by a correlation coefficient analysis: All three size variables 
(Area, Population, and Density) are negatively correlated with per capita GDP in Group 1 countries with statistical 
significances on the area. On the other hand, we find strong positive associations between area and population, and 
per capital income for countries in Group 2. There appears to be stratified economic relations between the size 
factors and the economic status of a country, whether as a “take-off” or “old-rich.” We further examined these 
differences by implementing panel regression analyses with control variables.2 
 
The numerical values below are correlation coefficients with the relative per capita GDP for each country group for 
the following variables: Area, Population, and Density. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-
sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observations are in country-years from 1955 until 2005. 
 
Table 4. Correlations with per capita GDP 
Group Area Population Density 
All 0.063** 
** 
-0.051** 
** 
0.141*** 
*** Group 1 -0.206*** 
*** 
-0.122 -0.039 
Group 2 0.177** 
** 
0.209*** 
*** 
-0.029 
 
  
 
With control variables mentioned in the previous section, this study conducts panel regressions covering 184 
countries (19, 17, and 148 countries in Groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively) and 11 five-year periods (from 1955 to 
2005): 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ'( = 𝛼' + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒'( + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙'( + 𝜖'(,  (1) 
 
where the GDP growth rate (Growth) is regressed onto the key explanatory variables (Size: population, density and 
area), controlled for accounting standards, anti-director rights, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, 
openness dummy variable and the respective proportions of secondary and higher education among the population 
of age over 25 for country 𝑖 and period 𝑡. 
 
In Table 5, seven panel regression models of GDP growth rate are identified with aforementioned explanatory 
variables. In Model 1, regressed with fixed effects, the economic values of population and density are reflected in 
the growth rate of an average economy, although the statistical significance of density is not conspicuous. In Models 
2, 3, and 4, the spatial dimension of economic growth is augmented and regressed with generalized least squares 
(GLS) effects assuming heteroskedasticity,3 controlled for development proxies for capital markets (SMCTG) and 
capitalism (AD and AS), and further for the 1955 real GDP (Model 3) and for Groups 1 and 2 dummies (Model 4). 
We find that economic growth is higher the smaller the country size holding other key and control variables 
constant. We also observe that an economy grows faster the more mature the capitalism in terms of investor 
protection (AD) and accounting standards (AS). Although the negative association of economic growth and relative 
stock market size (SMCTG) is economically unintuitive, it can be ascribed to the real-financial lag effects. 
 
The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate of each country. The explanatory variables are as follows: 
Population is in the unit of trillions. Density is the average headcound in the unit of millions per 1,000 square 
kilometers. Area is in the unit of billion square kilometers. For sovereign legal system indicators, we source 
accounting standards (AS) from La Porta et al. (1998) and anti-director rights (AD), which proxies for the degree of 
shareholder protection, from Djankov et al. (2008). STMCTG is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as a 
relative measure of country-specific equity market development, suggested by Djankov et al. (2008). Openness is a 
dummy variable per Sachs and Warner (1995). Secondary and Tertiary variables are the respective proportions of 
secondary and higher education among the population of age over 25 from Barro and Lee (2012). The panel dataset 
is constructed per Dempster et al. (1977) and van Dyk and Meng (2001) to minimize information loss from missing 
                                                
2 The dataset used for panel regression analyses is constructed per Dempster et al. (1977) and van Dyk and Meng (2001) to minimize information 
loss from missing estimates and observations. 
3 These models are fitted by GLS allowing for heteroskedasticity. Additional relaxation of autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation 
leaves the fitted results qualitatively equivalent. 
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estimates and observations. The numerical value below an estimate is the t or z-statistic. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observations are in 
country-years from 1955 until 2005. 
 
Table 5. Panel regressions of economic growth. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 
0.017*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.012* -0.012** -0.012** -0.014** 
33.470 -4.980 -3.230 -1.850 -2.180 -1.980 -2.040 
Population (× 109) 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
3.890 4.490 4.710 4.360 3.730 3.720 3.730 
Density (× 106  / 103 km2) 
1.167 1.742** 1.410** 1.801** 1.659** 1.603** 1.887*** 
1.070 2.340 2.000 2.400 2.390 2.340 2.580 
Area (× 109  km2) 
 -1.023** -1.338*** -1.198*** -0.879* -0.916* -1.030** 
 -2.400 -2.990 -2.620 -1.820 -1.860 -2.060 
AD 
 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 8.650 8.990 8.640 10.850 10.140 10.560 
AS 
 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 6.280 4.110 3.530 3.860 3.530 3.270 
SMCTG 
 -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
 -7.950 -8.380 -7.520 -9.500 -9.290 -9.020 
Openness 
    0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
    8.840 8.540 8.530 
Secondary 
    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
    9.320 9.120 9.160 
Tertiary 
    -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
    -3.650 -3.570 -3.610 
Fixed effects Yes No No No No No No 
GLS effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1955 real GDP dummy No No Yes No No Yes No 
Group 1 dummy No No No Yes No No Yes 
Group 2 dummy No No No Yes No No Yes 
Number of observations 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,958 
R2 0.005 0.087 0.092 0.092 0.120 0.121 0.121 
 
The spatial effect findings of economic growth are robust to the country-level degrees of economic openness and 
education level as exhibited in Models 5, 6, 7, which are fitted with GLS effects and additionally controlled for the 
1955 real GDP (Model 6) and for Groups 1 and 2 dummies (Model 7). A country experiences a more accelerated 
economic growth the more it is internationally open, and/or the higher its relative population in secondary education. 
Over-education may explain the negative association between economic growth and tertiary education. 
 
In sum, on average, an economy appears to grow faster the smaller the landmass, and/or the larger the potential 
workforce, and/or the higher the population density, controlled for the quality indices of capital markets, economic 
regime, openness, and human capital. We now turn to discussing the transition from take-off to slow-down by 
considering the non-linear aspects of economic growth in the next section. 
 
4. SUSTAINABILITY OF TAKE-OFF AND SLOW-DOWN OF AN ECONOMY 
 
Take-off is not sustainable by nature and an economy may slow down after a certain period of rapid growth 
regardless of its size. While we looked at the overall relationship between economic growth and its determinants in 
Section 3, this section focuses on Group 1 countries, or the so-called “take-offs,” specifically their economic 
propulsions and sequential contractions. A typical Group 1 country will not grow fast for good: Like an athlete who 
leaps in a long jump game will land after a short flight, an economy will decelerate after a certain period of high 
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degree of growth. According to Kuznets’s “inverted U hypothesis,” a country’s growth rate tends to rise as its 
income increases, but decreases as its income exceeds a certain threshold. 
 
For the sample countries in Group 1, this paper tests this hypothesis. In order to facilitate the concave nature of the 
hypothesis, we propose a non-linear model as follows: 
 𝐺 = 𝑦9𝑒:;< (2) 
 
 where G is the growth rate of each country, and y is the per capita GDP relative4 to that of the U.S. which was used 
in previous section as an explanatory variable. Non-linear model in equation (2) has an important mathematical 
advantage in that it can detect the point of reflection when an economy starts its slow-down, which cannot be 
captured by a typical quadratic equation. Visual shapes of each model are provided in Figure 1. 
 
Table 6 provides the regression results of selected Group 1 countries.5 Out of 19 countries, seven has positive 
coefficient estimates for both α and β. Singapore is chosen since it is one of the typical take-off examples. Moreover, 
its coefficient of α is significant, and that of β is nearly significant with a p-value equal to 0.118.  
 
Equation (2) appears to well capture the growth patterns of selected countries. These countries appear to show a 
wide range of variations in relative income: (Japan: 20 → 90%; Korea: 11 → 55%; Taiwan: 8 → 61%). These 
noticeable performances indicate their successful take-offs, and with these wide ranges, Equation (2) is deemed to 
provide a desirable fit to these countries. Detailed discussions on some of the prominent take-off countries are 
followed. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of our non-linear model and standard quadratic non-linear model 
 
Panel A. Our non-linear model 
 
 
 
  
                                                
4 The U.S. is a numéraire country used to compare various per capita GDPs of sample countries. 
5 The results for the entire countries are available upon request. 
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Panel B. Standard quadratic model 
 
 
The non-linear model is as follows: 
 𝐺 = 𝐼9𝑒:;> 
 
where G is the growth rate of each country, and I is the per capita GDP relative to that of the U.S. The numerical values below 
coefficient estimates are the t-statistics. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Non-linear regressions for Group 1 countries 
Country  β Country  β 
Bahamas -2.756 -0.175 South Korea 0.785 *** 0.028 ** 1.969 0.000 0.115 0.000 
Bermuda -0.646 -0.032 Kuwait 0.536 0.032 1.235 0.000 4.400 0.000 
Brunei -2.165 -0.051 Macao -0.214 -0.036 *** 2.336 0.000 0.202 0.000 
Chile -0.271 -0.055 Puerto Rico 0.907 *** 0.048 *** 0.730 0.000 0.220 0.000 
Cyprus 0.623 * 0.019 Qatar 1.571 0.075 0.320 0.000 3.474 0.000 
Germany 0.085 -0.004 Singapore 0.604 *** 0.013 1.145 0.000 0.123 0.000 
Greece 0.808 *** 0.037 * Spain 0.944 *** 0.044 *** 0.244 0.000 0.181 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.836 *** 0.027 *** Taiwan 0.926 *** 0.039 *** 0.100 0.000 0.056 0.000 
Ireland 0.165 -0.011 UAE 0.232 -0.013 0.148 0.000 0.800 0.000 
Japan 1.002 *** 0.042 ***    0.076 0.000 
 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are selected based on their relatively high model fit and similarity in terms of 
development processes. We begin with Japan. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 728 The Clute Institute 
4.1. Japan 
 
Japan is the first country in East Asia that experienced the “take-off.” Ever since its opening in the Meiji Revolution, 
Japan’s policies differentiated from its neighboring countries by actively accepting systems and cultures of the West 
(脱亜入欧, だつあにゅうおう: Leave Asia and Enter Europe). Even though its economy was destroyed at the end of 
World War II, it was revived by taking advantage of the Korean War. Its relative income in 1950 was already 20% 
of the U.S., which was the highest among all neighboring countries as China was 2.6% in 1952, Korea was 10.6% in 
1953, the Philippines was 12.9% in 1950, and Taiwan was 7.7% in 1951. 
 
A full-fledged take off began around 1958 when its income was 32.3% of the U.S. It took eight years (1950 → 
1958) for its income to increase from 20% to 30%, but only three years (1958 → 1961) from 30% to 40%. 
Remarkably, after the golden era of the 1960s and having hosted the Olympics, its income leaped to 70% of the U.S. 
in 1970. 
 
However, as shown in Panel A of Figure 2, the steep increase stagnated since 1970, mainly due to the first Oil 
Shock. It took 12 years to reach the 80% level (1970 → 1982). In the 1980s (until 1988), the relative income level 
had almost stagnated (81% in 1982 and 82% in 1988). An interesting phenomenon was observed between 1988 and 
1991 when the income level surged from 82% to 90.3%, thus reminding us of Japan’s golden era in the 1960s. 
However, this is mainly due to the yen appreciation, not to the economic growth. Since the Plaza Accord in 1985, 
yen against dollar had appreciated more than 50%, so the nominal value of Japan’s income level, expressed in terms 
of dollars, has increased without “real” growth. In other words, it was a temporary bubble. The evidence of this 
argument is the trend since 1991: The income level soon went back to 80% in 1997. However, coupled with a deep 
recession, Japan’s relative income is now only 70% of the U.S., which is the same level as in 1970. 
 
Figure 2. Panel A. Japan 
 
Panel A. Japan 
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Panel B. South Korea 
 
 
 
Panel C. Taiwan 
 
 
 
4.2. South Korea 
 
Korea showed no progress in the 1950s and early 1960s. Its relative income in 1953 was 10.6% of the U.S. and the 
income in 1962 was 10.4% of the U.S. However, since General Park Chung Hee overtook presidency through a 
military coup in 1961, its economy took off and its income had exceeded 20% of the U.S. in 1977 (Panel B, Figure 
2). Its upward trend had continued in the 1980s and 1990s as its income exceeded 30%, 40%, and 50% in 1986, 
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1990, and 1994, respectively. Due to the unprecedented currency depreciation after the financial crisis and IMF 
bailout in the late 1990’s, its relative income dropped from 52.8% in 1997 to 46.6% in 1998. However, it recovered 
from the aftermath of the crisis, and exceeded the 50% level in 2002. Unlike Japan, the relative income of Korea is 
still in an increasing phase; Japan is at around 70% with a decreasing trend, while Korea is around 55% and still 
increasing. It may be premature to predict, but it is likely that these two economies’ relative income level may 
converge in a decade or so. The PPP based per capita income of the two countries had already converged at around 
$28,000.  
 
To South Korea, potential reunification with North Korea may also poses a big external shock to its economy. With 
a successful transition to a merged entity, the unified Korea’s economy may undergo a second round of rapid growth 
and become a leading economy in Asia. 
 
4.3. Taiwan 
 
Taiwan’s development pattern is similar to that of Korea’s, but with a more stable trend. After being stagnated at 
around 10% of U.S. income, its take-off began in mid 1960s due to implementations of its reform and open 
economy policy. Its income achieved 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% relative to that of the U.S. in 1973, 1982, 1988, and 
1993, respectively (Panel C, Figure 2). Up to this point, Taiwan’s development pattern is very similar to that of 
Korea’s. However, unlike Korea that was devastated in the financial crisis in 1997, Taiwan was not much affected 
and its relative income levels did not experience sudden shrinkages. Due to the stable growth, its income level has 
achieved 60% of the U.S. 
 
4.4 Predictions of Future Take-Offs: Special Reference to China 
 
Descriptions on countries that have already experienced “take-offs” may be useful for predicting the growth patterns 
of developing countries that are about to take off and join Group 1. Given that most countries in Group 1 are small 
in terms of area and population, those small developing countries with the potentials to take-off will be good 
candidates. However, it appears that current rapidly growing countries are mostly large in terms of area and 
population: Consider China, for example. According to Table 7 China has shown a double-digit growth rate since 
2004, and its relative income has doubled in less than 10 years. China is deemed a likely candidate for the next 
Group 1 member country. Performances of other large countries, such as Brazil, Russia, and India as so-called 
“BRICS,” are not as conspicuous as China: The income of Brazil has increased to 22% of the U.S. in 2007 from 
16% in 1950; India from 6% to 9% in the last half century. Russian income records an overall decrease. Emerging 
markets in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have also shown increasing trends 
of relative income, but the process is not as impressive as the countries in Group 1 and China. Moreover, among the 
current developing economies, China shows a very significant non-linear regression result according to our 
untabulated report.6 
 
For this reason, this section focuses on China. More specifically, by looking at the data of several Group 1 countries, 
we attempted to predict how long the Chinese economy will remain “airborne” until when it will eventually slow 
down. First, consider the fitted result of China and the shape of Equation (2) in Figure 3. Mathematically, this 
function has a relatively long tail, meaning that its decreasing part is initially concave but becomes convex at a 
certain point. The decreasing rate is diminishing at a certain point, and the reflection point may be a starting point 
for the economy’s slowdown.  
 
  
                                                
6 The non-linear regression results are available upon request. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 731 The Clute Institute 
Per capita income of eight countries in Group 1 and prospective countries (BRICS, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam) 
for the group relative to the U.S in percent. 
 
Table 7. Per capita income of eight countries in Group 1 and selected countries 
Panel A: Japan-Greece 
Year Japan Korea Tai-wan Hong Kong Singapore Spain Greece 
1952 23.473  8.422   30.840 28.017 
1953 23.861 10.612 8.821   29.059 30.445 
1954 25.818 11.018 9.348   33.798 31.352 
1955 26.099 10.892 9.115   32.967 31.232 
1956 27.661 10.709 8.970   35.122 33.807 
1957 29.592 11.654 9.446   36.738 36.222 
1958 32.263 12.046 10.054   39.472 39.176 
1959 33.504 11.301 9.934   35.693 38.418 
1960 37.180 10.899 10.337 23.419 26.833 38.898 38.200 
1961 41.023 11.069 10.791 23.907 27.084 43.243 42.311 
1962 42.471 10.392 10.961 24.793 27.280 45.197 40.685 
1963 44.152 11.041 11.669 28.609 26.724 47.600 43.328 
1964 47.035 11.102 12.427 30.174 24.838 47.532 44.767 
1965 46.809 10.771 12.386 33.483 24.083 47.324 45.984 
1966 49.077 11.304 12.730 33.875 24.607 48.498 46.457 
1967 53.469 11.617 13.600 34.186 25.720 49.957 48.022 
1968 57.701 12.142 14.001 33.465 27.419 50.609 48.825 
1969 62.855 13.310 14.786 36.047 28.202 53.880 52.522 
1970 70.330 14.426 16.463 38.832 30.914 56.033 57.481 
1971 71.495 15.044 18.009 41.081 33.560 56.562 60.308 
1972 72.741 15.272 19.553 43.189 35.877 58.309 62.838 
1973 73.130 16.256 20.416 44.457 38.624 59.381 64.334 
1974 71.957 17.132 19.611 43.451 41.876 62.539 61.061 
1975 73.842 18.016 20.894 44.957 43.183 63.287 64.505 
1976 72.557 19.844 22.914 49.621 43.849 61.451 64.894 
1977 72.757 21.391 24.060 52.774 44.762 60.080 63.573 
1978 73.538 22.593 25.544 53.767 46.282 58.049 64.535 
1979 74.170 23.522 26.282 56.155 49.251 56.673 64.216 
1980 76.193 22.104 27.656 63.135 54.780 57.858 65.321 
1981 77.305 22.719 28.559 65.319 56.268 55.116 63.274 
1982 80.980 25.328 30.399 69.662 61.902 57.114 63.018 
1983 78.365 26.757 31.536 68.903 65.095 55.054 59.330 
1984 75.254 27.273 32.475 71.382 63.327 52.335 55.705 
1985 76.972 27.909 32.956 71.235 57.938 52.048 55.094 
1986 78.049 30.837 36.612 74.281 56.222 53.661 54.686 
1987 79.055 34.101 39.565 81.640 58.438 55.603 52.079 
1988 81.991 36.628 40.203 84.544 61.632 57.038 53.088 
1989 83.868 37.727 41.603 85.220 65.134 58.413 53.021 
1990 86.010 40.311 43.049 87.357 68.443 60.166 52.423 
1991 90.326 44.617 46.598 93.852 73.319 62.823 54.804 
1992 89.488 45.893 48.646 97.403 75.093 62.146 53.410 
1993 87.516 47.744 50.770 100.661 80.977 59.472 51.587 
1994 84.809 50.213 52.068 99.068 84.723 58.706 51.048 
1995 84.919 53.500 53.635 94.585 89.270 59.754 51.415 
1996 84.027 54.370 55.590 94.303 91.215 59.354 51.194 
1997 81.282 52.780 56.756 94.348 92.648 59.119 51.041 
1998 76.073 46.636 57.035 86.302 81.820 59.918 50.872 
1999 72.698 48.074 57.191 83.609 80.574 60.775 50.841 
2000 72.601 48.805 57.403 86.316 89.541 61.678 51.253 
2001 72.761 49.697 56.210 86.689 81.894 64.606 53.406 
2002 72.118 52.220 58.205 88.419 82.222 66.586 55.666 
2003 71.832 52.363 58.291 87.272 79.949 68.060 58.395 
2004 71.535 53.089 58.569 88.254 88.786 68.308 59.793 
2005 71.125 52.659 58.703 91.129 91.810 69.621 60.824 
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(Table 7 continued) 
Panel B: China-Vietnam 
Year China Brazil India Russia Malaysia Indonesia Thai-land Vietnam 
1952 2.644 17.040 6.103    8.400  
1953 2.718 16.688 6.163    7.480  
1954 2.807 18.319 6.461    8.004  
1955 2.725 17.583 6.026  14.773  7.000  
1956 2.922 17.563 6.102  14.337  7.016  
1957 3.014 18.838 6.032  13.635  7.730  
1958 3.394 20.111 6.549  13.173  7.936  
1959 3.241 20.083 6.282  14.775  8.205  
1960 3.155 20.940 6.525  15.679 5.238 8.820  
1961 2.714 23.137 6.638  15.165 5.230 8.951  
1962 2.596 22.488 6.493  14.671 5.234 9.004  
1963 2.609 22.635 6.627  14.356 4.772 9.206  
1964 2.705 21.920 6.633  14.146 4.562 9.157  
1965 2.782 21.677 6.065  14.253 4.161 9.108  
1966 2.793 20.882 5.634  13.897 3.826 9.551  
1967 2.661 21.434 5.902  13.484 3.849 10.052  
1968 2.410 22.216 5.829  12.960 4.207 10.281  
1969 2.518 21.953 6.161  13.600 4.222 10.530  
1970 2.726 24.455 6.232  14.020 4.603 11.210 4.549 
1971 2.787 26.065 6.237  15.885 4.745 10.846 4.492 
1972 2.673 27.167 5.853  15.526 4.934 10.436 4.276 
1973 2.709 28.746 5.591  17.349 5.363 11.206 3.923 
1974 2.799 31.038 5.540  19.008 6.388 11.324 4.015 
1975 2.966 31.773 5.869  17.936 6.543 11.598 4.073 
1976 2.833 33.219 5.793  20.007 6.560 11.796 4.214 
1977 2.847 32.785 5.809  20.700 6.983 12.295 4.506 
1978 3.013 31.841 5.826  20.560 7.083 12.982 4.265 
1979 3.241 32.683 5.499  22.436 8.024 12.739 4.393 
1980 3.573 35.165 5.797  24.576 9.384 13.393 4.280 
1981 3.725 31.834 5.956  23.791 9.767 13.678 4.341 
1982 4.247 32.643 6.259  25.072 10.088 14.326 4.726 
1983 4.421 29.920 6.210  25.216 10.096 14.286 4.752 
1984 4.599 28.927 5.959  25.665 9.870 14.162 4.706 
1985 4.978 28.317 6.044  23.590 9.722 13.797 4.701 
1986 5.185 30.122 6.161  20.657 9.352 13.986 4.647 
1987 5.523 29.560 6.252  21.704 9.406 14.694 4.595 
1988 5.685 28.117 6.387  22.767 9.279 15.754 4.543 
1989 5.610 26.574 6.397  23.504 9.749 16.786 4.491 
1990 5.917 25.585 6.557 41.356 24.801 10.603 18.456 4.802 
1991 6.507 25.687 6.571 42.138 26.808 11.420 20.309 5.101 
1992 7.099 24.720 6.553 37.388 28.162 11.798 21.704 5.263 
1993 8.052 24.772 6.583 29.367 29.741 12.074 22.742 5.277 
1994 8.673 24.893 6.619 23.807 30.992 12.249 23.438 5.308 
1995 9.274 25.198 6.922 21.936 33.277 12.821 24.669 5.618 
1996 9.758 24.635 6.844 20.395 34.992 13.226 25.123 5.792 
1997 9.838 24.084 6.864 19.337 35.001 13.348 23.046 5.979 
1998 9.976 22.843 6.967 17.365 32.079 12.074 19.360 6.050 
1999 10.257 21.623 7.260 18.634 32.486 11.048 18.793 6.111 
2000 10.570 21.544 7.098 21.607 33.655 11.214 18.557 6.171 
2001 11.408 21.530 7.296 21.540 32.847 11.336 18.700 6.485 
2002 12.377 21.850 7.316 22.094 34.009 11.299 19.436 6.713 
2003 13.280 21.385 7.531 23.604 35.811 11.673 20.521 6.894 
2004 14.081 21.662 7.686 25.529 37.466 11.465 20.978 7.200 
2005 15.483 21.496 8.038 27.703 39.363 11.664 20.698 7.777 
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Figure 3. Scatter plots and non-linear fitted growth curves of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China 
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Panel C. Taiwan 
 
 
 
Panel D. China 
 
 
A slowdown does not prescribe a perpetual halt in the economic growth. In other words, it tells us that the economy 
tends to progress further. At the reflection point, Japan’s income is 50% relative to that of the U.S. which 
undermines the reality to a certain extent as Japan undergoes a conspicuous growth phase at this stage. However, 
given that the Japanese economy stagnated at around 70% of U.S.’s income in the past 40 years (except during the 
bubble period of the late 1980’s), and its relative income may shrink even further due to a series of economic 
recessions and natural disasters, such as the strong tsunami shock in 2011, this estimate is deemed reasonable. South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are predicted to slow down at 62%, 51%, and 67% respectively. 
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China’s reflection point is at around 36%. This means that China’s slowdown period may arrive earlier than other 
countries. Considering that the Japanese economy bottlenecked at around 70% of U.S.’s income even though its 
reflection point was 50%, we may predict that the Chinese economy will sustain a high growth even though it 
reaches the reflection point, and will stay in a “warm” status for approximately additional 20% until it becomes 50-
60% relative to the U.S. This is unprecedented for there has been no large size economy which made such a rapid 
growth so far. However, in the current stage where China’s per capita income is 19.8% of the U.S. and is expected 
to rise sharply, it is reasonable to identify a “cooling point” for its economy. Moreover, given that China’s double 
digit growth may be partly due to the low price level, its growing inflation rate (5% in the first quarter of 2011) 
coupled with the overall global price increase in raw materials may lead to an early deceleration for its rapid growth 
(Barboza, 2008). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the relationship between the size of a country and its “take-off” for economic development. We 
find that small countries are not necessarily efficient in taking off. However, most countries that experienced the 
economic upheavals and have been under accelerated growth for the past decades were relatively small in terms of 
land size and population. Specifically, economic growth appears to be quicker the smaller the landmass, the larger 
the potential workforce, and the higher the population density, controlled for capital markets maturity, corporate 
governance, economic openness, and human capital development. The cases of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are 
examined with implications for the future growth prospect of China.  
 
Future research agenda can include providing prescriptions for extending the sustained high growth period. Readers 
may focus on examining policies that may lead to the successful completion of long jumps of currently developing 
countries. They can be spatial urban policies, as discussed in World Bank’s World Development Report 2009. A 
closer investigation of past long jumpers in Group 1 economies may provide answers for better policy prescriptions 
toward on-going jumpers.  
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